Prosecution for receiving, concealing, and facilitating
the transportation and concealment of narcotics. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Dudley B. Bonsal, J., entered a
judgment of conviction and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Waterman, Circuit Judge, held that under the circumstances the agents had
probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant, and the evidence
sustained the finding that the defendant, who took the agents to her hiding
place, had voluntarily consented to the seizure of the narcotics there.
Affirmed.
1. Arrest 71
Criminal Law
394.4(9)
If defendant's arrest on street corner without warrant was
illegal, search of her purse incident to that arrest was an illegal search and
narcotics so discovered would be inadmissible as evidence of defendant's guilt.
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 5 2(b, d), (c, f), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 173,
174.
2. Arrest
63(1)
Scope of statute authorizing agents to make arrests
without warrant for violation of narcotic drug laws is substantially equivalent
to extent of permission granted to law enforcement officers by Fourth
Amendment. 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7607(2); U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4.
3. Arrest
63(4)
Federal agents, who had been furnished description
of girl who was claimed to be source of narcotics for party with whom
undercover agent was negotiating for sale of heroin, had probable cause to
arrest defendant on street without warrant when her description fitted that
given to agents and she had appeared at appointed time and place at which sale
of narcotics was to be made. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 2(b, d), (c,
f), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 173, 174; 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1954) § 7607(2).
4. Arrest
63(4)
Time of arrest is crucial moment for determining
existence of probable cause for arrest without warrant.
5. Arrest 71
Criminal Law
394.4(9)
Agents' search of defendant's purse as incident to valid
arrest without warrant was lawful and heroin discovered thereby was admissible
in evidence against her. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, § 2(b, d), (c,
f), 21 U.S. C.A. §§ 173, 174.
6. Searches
and Seizures 7(28)
When accused consents to search or seizure conducted
without warrant protection he would have enjoyed under Fourth Amendment is lost
to him, but
accused's voluntary consent must be proven by clear and positive evidence.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4.
658
7. Searches
and Seizures 7(28)
Accused's
consent to search is not voluntary if it is product of duress or coercion,
actual or implicit; moreover, to be voluntary, it must be unequivocal, specific
and intelligently given. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4.
8. Searches and
Seizures 7(28)
When
law enforcement officer knocks at door, identifies himself, and asks to be
allowed to search premises acquiescence thus obtained is generally not
considered to be voluntary. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4.
9. Searches
and Seizures 7(28)
If defendant permits warrantless search of home or
establishment in mistaken belief that he has nothing there which will
incriminate him, search has been voluntarily consented to.
10. Searches and
Seizures 7(28)
Finding that defendant, who had been validly
arrested without a warrant and who took agents to apartment of another and
showed them suitcase which she stated contained heroin, had voluntarily
consented to seizure of narcotics in suitcase was supported by evidence.
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, § 2(b, d) (c, f), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 173,
174.
Julius Itzkowitz, New York City (Myron G. Lasser,
New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
Robert M. Morgenthau, U. S. Atty., Southern Dist. of
New York (Robert M. Cipes, Arnold N. Enker, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel),
for appellee.
Before CLARK, WATERMAN and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
WATERMAN, Circuit Judge.
After a trial before a judge sitting without a jury
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
appellant was convicted on March 15, 1962, on two counts of a five count
indictment. The two counts under which she was convicted, counts three and
four, charged her with receiving, concealing, and facilitating the
transportation and concealment of narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 173,
174 (1958). The district court sentenced appellant to five years imprisonment
upon count three, and seven years imprisonment upon count four, the two
sentences to run concurrently. Appellant now appeals from her conviction.
Appellant made a motion, subsequently denied, for an
order suppressing certain evidence, some taken from her person and some
obtained by the officers from an apartment. The testimony and exhibits
presented by the Government at the hearing on this motion and at appellant's
subsequent trial developed the following facts relating to appellant's arrest
and the events that followed. Appellant presented no evidence at either the
hearing or the trial.
On October 11, 1961, shortly after 1:30 P.M. at an
apartment in Hamilton Terrace in Manhattan, narcotics agents Robinson and
Scott, acting in undercover capacities, were negotiating with one George A.
Thompson for the purchase of one‑quarter kilogram of heroin. Thompson
told the agents that one‑quarter kilogram would cost them about $3,200,
but that he would have to go out and check on the price.
At approximately 2:05 P.M. Thompson left the
apartment in order to check the price he had quoted to the agent. After leaving
the apartment, Thompson was followed by two other narcotics agents, Wilcocki
and Garofalo. Thompson entered a taxi and rode to the Manufacturers Trust
branch bank at 125th Street and Eighth Avenue. He remained in the bank for
about five minutes, then entered another taxi and went to a building at 169
East 115th Street, which he entered.
He emerged from the building five minutes later with
appellant Ruth Smith. Then he caught a taxi back to Hamilton Terrace, arriving
there at approximately 3 :00 P.M.
Upon his return to the apartment at Hamilton Terrace
where agents Robin-
659
son and Scott were waiting, Thompson informed them
that one‑quarter kilogram of heroin would cost $3,600. He showed the
agents two one‑ounce glassine bags containing a white powder that he
claimed he had obtained from his source of supply. Agent Robinson asked
Thompson who this source of supply was and was told that it was a woman who
worked at a store. Thompson and agent Robinson then arranged to meet again at
2:00 P.M. the next day at 145th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue so that Robinson
could purchase a quarter kilogram of heroin.
After their conversation in the apartment Thompson
invited the two agents to lunch at a restaurant on 42nd Street. While at the
restaurant the three men entered the men's restroom, where Thompson pulled out
of his pocket two glassine bags of white powder and gave one of the bags to
agent Scott. This bag contained heroin.
The next day, October 12, agent Robinson met
Thompson at 2:30 P.M. at the corner of 145th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue.
Thompson asked for the purchase price of $3,600, but agent Robinson refused to
hand over the money. Instead, the officer opened the trunk of his car and
showed Thompson what was supposed to be the $3,600. Thompson then told Robinson
that he would go to his source of supply and find out if she would deliver the
heroin, cash on delivery.
Thompson then caught a taxi and, under the
surveillance of narcotics agents Wilcocki and Garofalo, drove to 169 East 115th
Street. After ten minutes Thompson emerged from the building and returned to
145th Street and St. Nicholas Avenue, where he rejoined Robinson and informed
the agent that the source of supply would deliver the heroin, cash on delivery.
Since the federal officer was to meet the source and receive the heroin from
her, he asked Thompson who she was. Thompson told him that she was a girl named
Ruth who had "blue hair" and worked at Goody's drug store.
Next, Thompson and Robinson walked over to a
telephone booth and Thompson placed a call. He said, "may I speak to
Ruth?" (pause) "Okay, I will call back in 15 minutes."
Then, on the pretext of calling his girl friend,
Robinson telephoned his office and told the agents there that Thompson's source
of supply was a girl by the name of Ruth who worked at Goody's drug store and
had blue hair.
At 4:00 P.M. Thompson again telephoned the number he
had called earlier and was heard by Robinson to say, "Okay, in 30 minutes
at 131st and Seventh Avenue."
At this point Robinson gave a prearranged signal;
then the covering agents Wilcocki and Garofalo placed Thompson under arrest,
searched him, and found in his pocket a glassine envelope containing heroin.
Upon subsequent interrogation of Thompson these two agents learned that a girl
named Ruth Smith was to deliver a quarter of a kilogram of heroin at 4:30 P.M.
at the corner of 131st Street and Seventh Avenue. Agents Wilcocki and Garofalo
also "arrested" agent Robinson and placed him in a separate car from
the one in which they put Thompson.
The three agents, with Thompson, then drove to 131st
Street and Seventh Avenue. By this time several other narcotics agents had
converged on this location. They observed appellant, who had come from Goody's
drug store, enter a building at 108 West 131st Street, emerge after ten or
fifteen minutes, and start to walk across Seventh Avenue on 131st Street. At
she crossed Seventh Avenue, two additional narcotics agents, Krueger and Cantu,
arrested her, searched her purse, and found a small package containing 131
grams of heroin. Krueger and Cantu did not possess a warrant of arrest.
The facts recited above relate to appellant's first
contention upon this appeal: namely, that appellant was illegally arrested and
searched. The following factual account relates to her second
660
contention, that after her arrest officers committed
an illegal search of premises at 108 West 131st Street.
Having arrested appellant, Krueger and Cantu seated
her in the back seat of Garofalo's car. At this point there is a divergence in
the testimony of agent Cantu and that of another participating agent, Manley.
Cantu testified that appellant was driven up Seventh Avenue about to 142nd
Street in agent Garofalo's car; and that en route, a trip of five to ten
minutes, agents Garofalo and Tripodi asked her where she got the package, and
who was in the apartment house they had been watching (presumably at 108 West
131st Street), to which she replied that. she did not know. He also testified
that they parked at 142nd Street, that appellant remained in the car, and that
there agent Manley assumed the bulk of the interrogation, questioning
appellant for more than half an hour.
Agent Manley testified, however, that at 131st
Street, immediately after the arrest, he put appellant in his own car, that
with agent Rahas he drove her to 142nd Street and Seventh Avenue, that en route
there was no conversation with appellant, and that once the car was parked he
began to interrogate her. From either account we conclude that appellant was
driven ten blocks up Seventh Avenue and that agent Manley commenced his
interrogation as soon as the trip was ended.
During his
questioning Manley asked appellant where the rest of the narcotics were. She
said she did not have any more. Agent Manley said, "Come on, Ruth, you
know better than that."
Mrs. Smith then began to cry
and said, "Yes, I have some more but I don't want to get anyone else in
trouble." She informed the narcotics agent that she had thrown out her
husband because he had been dealing in narcotics and now she herself felt
ashamed to be in the position she was in.
The agent replied, "Ruth, if that is your own,
you won't be getting anybody else in trouble."
Appellant answered, "All right. I will take you
to it but I will only take two of you. I don't want anyone else to go with me
because I don't want to cause any trouble."
Appellant led the narcotics
agents back to 108 West 131st Street, the building she had been observed to
enter just prior to her arrest. Mrs. Smith took agents Manley and Rahas to a
top floor apartment. There she knocked. An old man answered the door. Mrs.
Smith said to him, "Danny, there is no trouble. I just want my
suitcase." The old man stepped aside, and, followed by the two federal
officers, appellant entered the apartment. She walked over to a bed, reached
behind it, pulled out a suitcase, and placed it on the bed.
To Manley she said,
"The stuff is in the suitcase."
He replied, "Okay, Ruth, I will get it
out." Then appellant handed him a key, with which he opened the suitcase.
In the suitcase Manley found a brown paper bag which contained eleven packages
of heroin, weighing over two and a third kilograms.
After Manley had shown the contents of the bag to
Rahas, the agents, with appellant in custody, left the apartment, taking with
them the heroin which they had discovered there. The agents made no further
search of the premises.
From 131st Street the narcotics agents drove to
appellant's residence on 115th Street near Second Avenue. Agents Rahas and
Garofalo went with appellant to her apartment and there recovered $500.00 which
the Government had used to purchase narcotics on previous occasions, appellant
taking the money out of a suitcase and handing it to the federal officers. They
were in this apartment for no more than five minutes. While the others were in
the apartment on 115th Street, agent Manley remained downstairs in the car
with the narcotics taken from the 131st Street apartment. Then the officers
drove appellant to the offices of the Bureau of Narcotics at 90 Church
661
Street in Manhattan, arriving there sometime between
5:30 and 6:30.1
[1] As we stated earlier, the
first question upon this appeal is whether appellant's arrest on the corner of
131st Street and Seventh Avenue was a legal arrest. If illegal, the search of
her purse incident to that arrest was an illegal search, and the narcotics so
discovered would be inadmissible as evidence of appellant's guilt. See Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925); United States
v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519 (7 Cir.1957); Wrightson v. United States, 95
U.S.App.D.C. 390, 222 F.2d 556, 559 (1955 ).
The relevant statute is Narcotics Control Act §
104(a) (2), 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. § 7607(2) (1958). It states in
pertinent part:
"§ 7607. Additional authority for bureau of narcotics
and bureau of customs
" * * * [A]gents, of
the Bureau of Narcotics of the Department of the Treasury * * " may– * * *
"(2) make arrests
without warrant for violations of any law of the United States relating to
narcotic drugs (as defined in section 4731) or marihuana (as defined in section
4761) where the violation is committed in the presence of the person making the
arrest or where such person has reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed or is committing such violation."
[2] Therefore, the question
becomes one of whether the agents had "reasonable grounds," or, as it
is more often labeled, "probable cause," for believing that appellant
had committed or was committing a violation of the narcotics laws. The scope of
section 104(a) (2) of the Narcotics Control Act is substantially equivalent to
the extent of the permission granted to law enforcement officers by the Fourth
Amendment. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3
L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Rodgers v. United States, 267 F.2d 79, 84 (9 Cir.1959).
The principles involved in the concept of probable
cause, which justifies an arrest without a warrant, are set forth in the oft‑quoted
opinion of the Supreme Court in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175‑176,
69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)
"In dealing with probable cause, however, as
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical;
they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof
is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
"'The substance of all the definitions' of
probable cause 'is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.' McCarthy v. De
Armit, 99 Pa.St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U.S.
at 161 [45 S.Ct. at 288, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790]. And this ‘means less
than evidence which would justify condemnation' or conviction, as Marshall, C.
J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7
Cranch 339, 348 [3 L.Ed. 364]. Since Marshall's time, at any rate, it has come
to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of
1. At the hearing on the
motion to suppress, agent Manley testified that after leaving the first
apartment, 108 West 1331st Street, the officers took Mrs. Smith directly to
their office at 90 Church Street. At the subsequent trial, however, he
testified that, at the time of the earlier hearing he had forgotten about the
visit to the 115th Street apartment.
662
reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense
has been or is being committed." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 [45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543, 39 A.L.R. 790].
"These long‑prevailing standards seek to
safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because many situations which
confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical,
non-technical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly
hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law‑abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." (Footnotes
omitted.)
See Draper v. United States, supra, 358 U.S. at 311‑312,
79 S.Ct. 329; United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2 Cir.), cent.
denied sub nom. Cryne v. United States, 326 U.S. 727, 66 S.Ct. 33, 90 L.Ed. 432
(1945); Cervantes v. United States, 263 F.2d 800, 803 (9 Cir. 1959).
[3] In the light of these
principles there was abundant evidence to support a finding that the officers
had probable cause to justify their arrest of the appellant.
Thompson told two narcotics agents operating in undercover
capacities that his source of supply was a girl whose description fitted that
of the appellant. This information standing alone was perhaps not enough to
give the Government reasonable grounds for arresting Mrs. Smith, for when the
agents' only knowledge of the defendant's crime is the statement of an informer
who the agents do not know to be reliable, it has generally been held that the
agent do not have probable cause for an arrest. See Rodgers v. United States,
supra, 267 F.2d at. 85; Contee v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 215 F.2d
324, 326‑327 (1954), and cases cited therein at 327 n. 1; Wrightson v.
United States, supra, 222 F.2d at 558 n. 3; Cervantes v. United States, supra,
263 F.2d at 804 (dictum). The Government asserts that a statement by a narcotic
peddler to a federal agent while in disguise is more trustworthy than the word
of a knowing informer. Appellant naturally takes the contrary position. In
passing, we only observe that there was a valid reason for honesty on
Thompson's part: the arrangement under which the heroin was to be sold to the
agent required that the agent meet appellant and, therefore, required that the
agent be able to identify her.
Moreover, there is extensive reliable evidence,
additional to the word of a narcotics peddler, sufficient to establish the
requisite probable cause to justify the arrest in this case. On October 11, in
order to make certain he was quoting a correct price for the heroin to be sold.
Thompson left the apartment, went to a bank, and then met appellant–all under
the surveillance of two narcotic agents. Upon Thompson's return to the
apartment he showed the would‑be purchasers two bags that apparently contained
heroin. It was reasonable to infer that he got this heroin from appellant. On
the next day, in order to check another detail of the sale with his source of
supply, Thompson left his potential buyer, agent Robinson, went directly to the
building where he had been seen with appellant on the day before, returned, and
reported what his source of supply had told him.
Finally, Thompson set up a rendezvous between his
source of supply and agent Robinson at 131st Street and Seventh Avenue.
Appellant turned up at the appointed place at the appointed time.
663
This fact alone is an important factor in
determining probable cause. Spurlock v. United States, 295 F.2d 387 (9 Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 877, 82 S.Ct. 1149, 8 L.Ed.2d 280 (1962); see
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959).
[4, 5] By the time of the arrest,
which is the crucial moment for determining the existence of probable cause,
see Rodgers v. United States, 267 F.2d 79, 88 (9 Cir.1959), Thompson's reliability
had been sufficiently corroborated so that the agents had the requisite
probable cause to arrest appellant. We hold that appellant's arrest and the
search incident thereto were lawful.
We turn to the remaining question raised by this appeal,
whether the seizure of the narcotics at 108 West 131st Street was illegal as
having been an unreasonable one contrary to the protection afforded
householders by the Fourth Amendment. Inasmuch as the agents who seized the
narcotics had no search warrant, the validity of the seizure depends upon
whether appellant consented to the agents' seizure of the narcotics.
[6, 7] The principles which govern
us have been well stated in previous opinions. When an accused consents to a search or seizure
conducted without a search warrant, the protection he would have enjoyed under
the Fourth Amendment is lost to him. United States v. Bianco, 96
F.2d 97 (2 Cir.19 38); United States v. Shules, 65 F.2d 780 (2 Cir. 1933).
However, an
accused's voluntary consent must be proven by clear and positive evidence, A
consent is not a voluntary one if it is the product of duress or coercion,
actual or implicit. Moreover, to be voluntary, a consent must have been
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given. Judd v. United
States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (1951); see Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921); Karwicki v. United
States, 55 F.2d 225, 226 (4 Cir.1932) (per curiam); Kovach v. United States, 53
F.2d 639 (6 Cir.1931) (per curiam); United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484, 490‑491
(S.D. Ill.1921).
[8] But the case‑by‑case
application of these principles is not, always easy. The line between an
accused's voluntary consent and his involuntary submission to police authority
is often difficult to draw. Though all the cases involving the legality of
warrantless searches and seizures are not fully reconcilable, some guidelines
are discernible. When a law enforcement officer knocks at the door, identifies himself, and
asks to be allowed to search the premises, the acquiescence this obtained is
generally not considered to be voluntary consent. See Judd v. United
States, supra; United States v. Marquette, 271 F. 120 (N.D.Ca1.1920), appeal
dismissed, 270 F. 214 (9 Cir. 1921); United States v. Slusser, 270 F. 818
(S.D.Ohio 1920); United State v. Maria, 40 F.2d 271 (W.D.N.Y.1930). Likewise, if the defendant
denies his guilt, asserts that the police will find nothing (perhaps hoping
that the contraband is too well concealed for discovery), and
"encourages" the officers to search the premises, even then it has
been held that there has been no voluntary consent to the ensuing search. See
Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9 Cir. 1960); Judd v. United States,
supra; Higgins v. United States, 93 U.S.App. D.C. 340, 209 F.2d 819 (1954). But
see United States v. Adelman, 107 F.2d 497 (2 Cir.1939). In the Higgins case it
was stated, 209 F.2.d at 820: "[N]o sane man who denies his guilt would actually be
willing that policemen search his room for contraband which is certain to be
discovered."
[9] On the other hand, if the
defendant permits a warrantless search of his home or establishment in the
mistaken belief that he has nothing there which will incriminate him, it has been held
that the search has been voluntarily consented to. United States v.
DeVivo, 190 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.N.Y.1961); United: States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d
949 (2 Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912, 79 S. Ct. 1298, 3 L.Ed.2d 1262
(1959). Also, if the defendant admits his guilt to the
664
officer, instead of denying it to him, and then
allows a search without a warrant, this strongly implies voluntary consent on
his part. United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140
(1944). Furthermore, the degree of affirmative assistance given to the police
by the suspect is often relevant in determining whether consent exists. See
United States v. Burgos, 269 F.2d 763 (2 Cir.1959 ), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
942, 80 S.Ct. 808. 4 L.Ed.2d 771 (1960); United States v. MacLeod, 207 F.2d 853
(7 Cir.1953).
[10] In view of these principles
and analogous cases, we hold that the evidence supports the finding that
appellant voluntarily consented to the seizure of narcotics at 108 West 131st
Street. Except for a few minor inconsistencies in testimony, we have no basis
for doubting the credibility of the narcotics agents, inasmuch as appellant put
in no evidence whatsoever at either the hearing or the trial. Cf. United States
v. DeVivo, 190 F.Supp. 483, 484 (E.D.N.Y.1961). The testimony of the officers clearly
supports consent by the appellant. The narcotics agents could not have
questioned her for more than an hour before she agreed to take them to the spot
where the narcotics were kept. There was no evidence that the officers used any
coercion in their interrogation, an interrogation conducted in an automobile
parked on a city street in the daytime. While the car was so parked at 142nd
Street, appellant admitted to having custody of more heroin than that found in
her purse when she was arrested. She then agreed to take two agents to this
additional heroin. At 108 West 131st Street it was she who produced the
suitcase containing the heroin and the key with which to open that suitcase.
The officers made no search or seizure while in the apartment beyond the
seizure which appellant agreed could be made before she led the officers there.
In this case, therefore, the proven facts
demonstrate that the appellant suffered no deprivation of her constitutional
right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures inasmuch as she gave
her consent to the seizure of the heroin in the apartment. As we have shown,
she voluntarily admitted to the narcotics agents that she had more narcotics
than were on her person at the time of her legal arrest. She was under no compulsion
when she led the officers to the place of hiding, and she actively assisted
them from that time forward.