FLORIDA
v.
WHITE
certiorari to
the supreme court of florida
No. 98-223.
Argued March 23, 1999--Decided May 17, 1999
Two months after officers observed respondent using
his car to deliver cocaine, he was arrested at his workplace on unrelated
charges. At that time, the arresting officers seized his car without securing a
warrant because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the
Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (Act). During a subsequent inventory search,
the police discovered cocaine in the car. Respondent was then charged with a
state drug violation. At his trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the
evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless
seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the
"fruit of the poisonous tree." After the jury returned a guilty
verdict, the court denied the motion, and the Florida First District Court of
Appeal affirmed. It also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question
whether, absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile
under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. The latter court answered the
question in the affirmative, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded.
Held: The Fourth Amendment does not require the
police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place
when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. In
deciding whether a challenged governmental action violates the Amendment, this
Court inquires whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and
seizure when the Amendment was framed. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267
U. S. 132, 149. This Court has held that when federal officers have
probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment does not require them to obtain a warrant prior to searching the car
for and seizing the contraband. Id., at 150-151. Although the police here
lacked probable cause to believe that respondent's car contained contraband,
they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under
Florida law. A recognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband
before it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the early federal laws relied
upon in Carroll. This need is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed
to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure. In addition,
this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently accorded officers
greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places. Here, because the
police seized respondent's vehicle from a public area, the warrantless seizure
is virtually indistinguishable from the seizure upheld in G. M. Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U. S. 338, 351. Pp. 3-7.
710 So. 2d 949, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer,
JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Breyer, J.,
joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLORIDA, PETITIONER
v.
TYVESSEL TYVORUS WHITE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
florida
[May 17, 1999]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act provides that
certain forms of contraband, including motor vehicles used in violation of the
Act's provisions, may be seized and potentially forfeited. In this case, we
must decide whether the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain a
warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have
probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. We hold that it
does not.
I
On three occasions in July and August 1993, police
officers observed respondent Tyvessel Tyvorus White using his car to deliver
cocaine, and thereby developed probable cause to believe that his car was
subject to for-feiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act (Act), Fla. Stat. §932.701 et seq. (1997).1 Several months later, the police arrested respondent at his
place of employment on charges unrelated to the drug transactions observed in
July and August 1993. At the same time, the arresting officers, without
securing a warrant, seized respondent's automobile in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. See §932.703(2)(a).2 They seized the vehicle solely
because they believed that it was forfeitable under the Act. During a
subsequent inventory search, the police found two pieces of crack cocaine in
the ashtray. Based on the discovery of the cocaine, respondent was charged with
possession of a controlled substance in violation of Florida law.
At his trial on the possession charge, respondent
filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the inventory search.
He argued that the warrantless seizure of his car violated the Fourth
Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the "fruit of the poisonous
tree." The trial court initially reserved ruling on respondent's motion,
but later denied it after the jury returned a guilty verdict. On appeal, the
Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed. 680 So. 2d 550 (1996).
Adopting the position of a majority of state and federal courts to have
considered the question, the court rejected respondent's argument that the
Fourth Amendment required the police to secure a warrant prior to seizing his
vehicle. Id., at 554. Because the Florida Supreme Court and this Court had not
directly addressed the issue, the court certified to the Florida Supreme Court
the question whether, absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless seizure of
an automobile under the Act violated the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 555.
In a divided opinion, the Florida Supreme Court
answered the certified question in the affirmative, quashed the First District
Court of Appeal's opinion, and remanded. 710 So. 2d 949, 955 (1998). The
majority of the court concluded that, absent exigent circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to seizing property
that has been used in violation of the Act. Ibid. According to the court, the
fact that the police develop probable cause to believe that such a violation
occurred does not, standing alone, justify a warrantless seizure. The court
expressly rejected the holding of the Eleventh Circuit, see United States v.
Valdes, 876 F. 2d 1554 (1989), and the majority of other Federal Circuits
to have addressed the same issue in the context of the federal civil forfeiture
law, 21 U. S. C. §881, which is similar to Florida's. See United States v.
Decker, 19 F. 3d 287 (CA6 1994) (per curiam); United States v. Pace, 898
F. 2d 1218, 1241 (CA7 1990); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711
F. 2d 1297 (CA5 1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F. 2d 397 (CA4 1982); United
States v. Bush, 647 F. 2d 357 (CA3 1981). But see United States v. Dixon, 1
F. 3d 1080 (CA10 1993); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F. 2d 1300 (CA2
1992); United States v. Linn, 880 F. 2d 209 (CA9 1989). We granted
certiorari, 525 U. S. ___ (1998), and now reverse.
II
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures," and further provides that "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U. S. Const., Amdt.
4. In deciding whether a challenged governmental action violates the Amendment,
we have taken care to inquire whether the action was regarded as an unlawful
search and seizure when the Amendment was framed. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U. S. ___, ___ (1999); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149
(1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens").
In Carroll, we held that when federal officers have
probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment does not require them to obtain a warrant prior to searching the car
for and seizing the contraband. Our holding was rooted in federal law
enforcement practice at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.
Specifically, we looked to laws of the First, Second, and Fourth Congresses
that authorized federal officers to conduct warrantless searches of ships and
to seize concealed goods subject to duties. Id., at 150-151 (citing Act of July
31, 1789, §§24, 29, 1 Stat. 43; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §50, 1 Stat. 170; Act of
Feb. 18, 1793, §27, 1 Stat. 315; Act of Mar. 2, 1799, §§68-70, 1 Stat. 677,
678). These enactments led us to conclude that "contemporaneously with the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment," Congress distinguished "the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to forfeiture, when
concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in course of
transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be
put out of reach of a search warrant." 267 U. S., at 151.
The Florida Supreme Court recognized that under
Carroll, the police could search respondent's car, without obtaining a warrant,
if they had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. The court,
however, rejected the argument that the warrantless seizure of respondent's
vehicle itself also was appropriate under Carroll and its progeny. It reasoned
that "[t]here is a vast difference between permitting the immediate search
of a movable automobile based on actual knowledge that it then contains
contraband [and] the discretionary seizure of a citizen's automobile based upon
a belief that it may have been used at some time in the past to assist in
illegal activity." 710 So. 2d, at 953. We disagree.
The principles underlying the rule in Carroll and
the founding-era statutes upon which they are based fully support the
conclusion that the warrantless seizure of respondent's car did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Although, as the Florida Supreme Court observed, the police
lacked probable cause to believe that respondent's car contained contraband,
see 710 So. 2d, at 953, they certainly had probable cause to believe that the
vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law.3 Recognition of the need to
seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away undoubtedly
underlies the early federal laws relied upon in Carroll. See 267 U. S., at
150-152; see also California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 390 (1985); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 367 (1976). This need is equally
weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that
the police seek to secure.4 Furthermore, the early federal statutes that we
looked to in Carroll, like the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, authorized
the warrantless seizure of both goods subject to duties and the ships upon
which those goods were concealed. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 43, 46; 1 Stat. 170, 174;
1 Stat. 677, 678, 692.
In addition to the special considerations recognized
in the context of movable items, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
consistently accorded law enforcement officials greater latitude in exercising
their duties in public places. For example, although a warrant presumptively is
required for a felony arrest in a suspect's home, the Fourth Amendment permits
warrantless arrests in public places where an officer has probable cause to
believe that a felony has occurred. See United States v. Watson, 423 U. S.
411, 416-424 (1976). In explaining this rule, we have drawn upon the
established "distinction between a warrantless seizure in an open area and
such a seizure on private premises." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S.
573, 587 (1980); see also id., at 586-587 ("It is also well settled that
objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by
the police without a warrant"). The principle that underlies Watson
extends to the seizure at issue in this case. Indeed, the facts of this case
are nearly indistinguishable from those in G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U. S. 338 (1977). There, we considered whether federal agents
violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to secure a warrant prior to seizing
automobiles in partial satisfaction of income tax assessments. Id., at 351. We
concluded that they did not, reasoning that "[t]he seizures of the
automobiles in this case took place on public streets, parking lots, or other
open places, and did not involve any invasion of privacy." Ibid. Here,
because the police seized respondent's vehicle from a public area--respondent's
employer's parking lot--the warrantless seizure also did not involve any
invasion of respondent's privacy. Based on the relevant history and our prior
precedent, we therefore conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not require a
warrant to seize respondent's automobile in these circumstances.
The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLORIDA, PETITIONER
v.
TYVESSEL TYVORUS WHITE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
florida
[May 17, 1999]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Breyer joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion subject to a
qualification against reading our holding as a general endorsement of
warrantless seizures of anything a State chooses to call
"contraband," whether or not the property happens to be in public
when seized. The Fourth Amendment does not concede any talismanic significance
to use of the term "contraband" whenever a legislature may resort to
a novel forfeiture sanction in the interest of law enforcement, as legislatures
are evincing increasing ingenuity in doing, cf., e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U. S. 442, 443-446 (1996); id., at 458 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 81-82, and
n. 1 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(expressing concern about the breadth of new forfeiture statutes). Moreover, G.
M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U. S. 338 (1977), (upon which we
rely today) endorsed the public character of a warrantless seizure scheme by
reference to traditional enforcement of government revenue laws, id., at
351-352, and n. 18 (citing, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856)), and the legality of seizing abandoned
contraband in public view, 429 U. S., at 352 (citing Hester v. United
States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924)).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLORIDA, PETITIONER
v.
TYVESSEL TYVORUS WHITE
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
florida
[May 17, 1999]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.
During the summer of 1993, Florida police obtained
evidence that Tyvessel White was engaged in the sale and delivery of narcotics,
and that he was using his car to facilitate the enterprise. For reasons
unexplained, the police neither arrested White at that point nor seized his
automobile as an instrumentality of his alleged narcotics offenses. Most
important to the resolution of this case, the police did not seek to obtain a
warrant before seizing White's car that fall--over two months after the last
event that justified the seizure. Instead, after arresting White at work on an
unrelated matter and obtaining his car keys, the officers seized White's
automobile without a warrant from his employer's parking lot and performed an
inventory search. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the seizure, which
took place absent exigent circumstances or probable cause to believe that
narcotics were present, was invalid. 710 So. 2d 949 (1998).1
In 1971, after advising us that "we must not
lose sight of the Fourth Amendment's fundamental guarantee," Justice
Stewart made this comment on what was then settled law:
"[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this
area is that `searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.' The exceptions are `jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must
be `a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the
situation made that course imperative.' `[T]he burden is on those seeking the
exemption to show the need for it.' " Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U. S. 443, 453, 454-455 (footnotes omitted).
Because the Fourth Amendment plainly "protects
property as well as privacy" and seizures as well as searches, Soldal v.
Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 62-64 (1992), I would apply to the present case
our longstanding warrant presumption.2 In the context of property seizures by
law enforcement authorities, the presumption might be overcome more easily in
the absence of an accompanying privacy or liberty interest. Nevertheless, I
would look to the warrant clause as a measure of reasonableness in such cases,
United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407
U. S. 297, 315 (1972), and the circumstances of this case do not convince
me that the role of a neutral magistrate was dispensable.
The Court does not expressly disavow the warrant
presumption urged by White and followed by the Florida Supreme Court, but its
decision suggests that the exceptions have all but swallowed the general rule.
To defend the officers' warrantless seizure, the State points to cases
establishing an "automobile exception" to our ordinary demand for a
warrant before a lawful search may be conducted. Each of those cases, however,
involved searches of automobiles for contraband or temporary seizures of
automobiles to effect such searches.3 Such intrusions comport with the practice
of federal customs officers during the Nation's early history on which the
majority relies, as well as the practicalities of modern life. But those
traditions and realities are weak support for a warrantless seizure of the
vehicle itself, months after the property was proverbially tainted by its
physical proximity to the drug trade, and while the owner is safely in police
custody.
The stated purposes for allowing warrantless vehicle
searches are likewise insufficient to validate the seizure at issue, whether
one emphasizes the ready mobility of automobiles or the pervasive regulation
that diminishes the owner's privacy interests in such property. No one
seriously suggests that the State's regulatory regime for road safety makes
acceptable such unchecked and potentially permanent seizures of automobiles
under the State's criminal laws. And, as the Florida Supreme Court cogently
explained, an exigent circumstance rationale is not available when the seizure
is based upon a belief that the automobile may have been used at some time in
the past to assist in illegal activity and the owner is already in custody.4
Moreover, the state court's conclusion that the warrant process is a sensible
protection from abuse of government power is bolstered by the inherent risks of
hindsight at post-seizure hearings and law enforcement agencies' pecuniary
interest in the seizure of such property. See Fla. Stat. §932.704(1) (1997);
cf. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. 43, 55-56
(1993).
Were we confronted with property that Florida deemed
unlawful for private citizens to possess regardless of purpose, and had the
State relied on the plain-view doctrine, perhaps a warrantless seizure would
have been defensible. See Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128 (1990);
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U. S. 321, 327 (1987) (citing Payton v. New York,
445 U. S. 573 (1980)). But " `[t]here is nothing even remotely
criminal in possessing an automobile,' " Austin v. United States, 509
U. S. 602, 621 (1993) (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U. S. 693, 699 (1965)); no serious fear for officer safety or loss of
evidence can be asserted in this case considering the delay and circumstances
of the seizure; and only the automobile exception is at issue, 710 So. 2d,
at 952; Brief for Petitioner 6, 28.5
In any event, it seems to me that the State's
treatment of certain vehicles as "contraband" based on past use
provides an added reason for insisting on an appraisal of the evidence by a
neutral magistrate, rather than a justification for expanding the discretionary
authority of the police. Unlike a search that is contemporaneous with an
officer's probable-cause determination, Horton, 496 U. S., at 130-131, a
belated seizure may involve a serious intrusion on the rights of innocent
persons with no connection to the earlier offense. Cf. Bennis v. Michigan, 516
U. S. 442 (1996). And a seizure supported only by the officer's conclusion
that at some time in the past there was probable cause to believe that the car
was then being used illegally is especially intrusive when followed by a
routine and predictable inventory search--even though there may be no basis for
believing the car then contains any contraband or other evidence of
wrongdoing.6
Of course, requiring police officers to obtain
warrants in cases such as the one before us will not allay every concern
private property owners might have regarding government discretion and
potentially permanent seizures of private property under the authority of a
State's criminal laws. Had the officers in this case obtained a warrant in July
or August, perhaps they nevertheless could or would have executed that warrant
months later; and, as the Court suggests, ante, at 5, n. 4, delay between
the basis for a seizure and its effectuation might support a Fourth Amendment
objection whether or not a warrant was obtained. That said, a warrant
application interjects the judgment of a neutral decisionmaker, one with no
pecuniary interest in the matter, see Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 245,
250-251 (1977) (per curiam), before the burden of obtaining possession of the
property shifts to the individual. Knowing that a neutral party will be
involved before private property is seized can only help ensure that law
enforcement officers will initiate forfeiture proceedings only when they are
truly justified. A warrant requirement might not prevent delay and the
attendant opportunity for official mischief through discretionary timing, but
it surely makes delay more tolerable.
Without a legitimate exception, the presumption
should prevail. Indeed, the particularly troubling aspect of this case is not that
the State provides a weak excuse for failing to obtain a warrant either before
or after White's arrest, but that it offers us no reason at all. The
justification cannot be that the authorities feared their narcotics
investigation would be exposed and hindered if a warrant had been obtained. Ex
parte warrant applications provide neutral review of police determinations of
probable cause, but such procedures are by no means public. And the officers
had months to take advantage of them. On this record, one must assume that the
officers who seized White's car simply preferred to avoid the hassle of seeking
approval from a judicial officer. I would not permit bare convenience to
overcome our established preference for the warrant process as a check against
arbitrary intrusions by law enforcement agencies "engaged in the often
competitive"--and, here, potentially lucrative--"enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15
(1948).
Because I agree with the Florida Supreme Court's
judgment that this seizure was not reasonable without a warrant, I respectfully
dissent.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1
That Act provides, in relevant part: "Any
contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal property,
or real property used in violation of any provision of the Florida Contraband
Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is taking place, may be seized and shall
be forfeited." Fla. Stat. §932.703(1)(a) (1997).
Footnote 2
Nothing in the Act requires the police to obtain a
warrant prior to seizing a vehicle. See State v. Pomerance, 434 So. 2d
329, 330 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983). Rather, the Act simply provides that
"[p]ersonal property may be seized at the time of the violation or
subsequent to the violation, if the person entitled to notice is notified at
the time of the seizure ... that there is a right to an adversarial preliminary
hearing after the seizure to determine whether probable cause exists to believe
that such property has been or is being used in violation of the Florida
Contraband Forfeiture Act." §932.703(2)(a).
Footnote 3
The Act defines "contraband" to include
any "vehicle of any kind, ... which was used ... as an instrumentality in
the commission of, or in aiding or abetting in the commission of, any
felony." §932.701(2)(a)(5).
Footnote 4
At oral argument, respondent contended that the
delay between the time that the police developed probable cause to seize the
vehicle and when the seizure actually occurred undercuts the argument that the
warrantless seizure was necessary to prevent respondent from removing the car
out of the jurisdiction. We express no opinion about whether excessive delay
prior to a seizure could render probable cause stale, and the seizure therefore
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
FOOTNOTES
Footnote 1
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion could be read to
suggest that due process protections in the Florida Constitution might
independently require a warrant or other judicial process before seizure under
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. See 710 So. 2d, at 952 (discussing
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (1991)).
However, the certified question put to that court referred only to the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 710 So. 2d, at 950. Thus, a
viable federal question was presented for us to decide on certiorari, but of
course we have no authority to determine the limits of state constitutional or
statutory safeguards.
Footnote 2
E.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court for
Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U. S. 297, 315-318 (1972) ("Though the
Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of `unreasonable searches and seizures,' the
definition of `reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on the more specific
commands of the warrant clause"); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U. S. 443, 454-455 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357
(1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Harris v.
United States, 331 U. S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("[W]ith minor and severely confined exceptions, inferentially a part of
the Amendment, every search and seizure is unreasonable when made without a
magistrate's authority expressed through a validly issued warrant"),
overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969); see also
Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U. S. 345, 348 (1972) (noting "the now accepted
fact that someone independent of the police and prosecution must determine
probable cause"); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482
(1963).
Footnote 3
See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132, 153 (1925) (where the police have probable cause, "contraband goods
concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be
searched for without a warrant"); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S.
798, 820, n. 26, 825 (1982) ("During virtually the entire history of our
country--whether contraband was transported in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921
roadster, or a modern automobile--it has been assumed that a lawful search of a
vehicle would include a search of any container that might conceal the object
of the search"); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. __, __ (1999) (slip
op., at 3-5); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938, 940 (1996) (per
curiam) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe
it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the
vehicle without more").
Footnote 4
710 So. 2d 949, 953-954 (Fla. 1998)
("There simply was no concern presented here that an opportunity to seize
evidence would be missed because of the mobility of the vehicle. Indeed, the
entire focus of the seizure here was to seize the vehicle itself as a prize
because of its alleged prior use in illegal activities, rather than to search
the vehicle for contraband known to be therein, and that might be lost if not
seized immediately"). The majority notes, ante, at 5, n. 4, but does
not confront, the argument that the mobility of White's vehicle was not a
substantial governmental concern in light of the delay between establishing
probable cause and seizure.
Footnote 5
There is some force to the majority's reliance on
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976), which held that no warrant
is required for felony arrests made in public. Ante, at 6. With respect to the
seizures at issue in Watson, however, I consider the law enforcement and public
safety interests far more substantial, and the historical and legal traditions
more specific and engrained, than those present on the facts of this case. See
423 U. S., at 415-424; id., at 429 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[L]ogic
sometimes must defer to history and experience").
Footnote 6
The Court's reliance on G. M. Leasing Corp. v.
United States, 429 U. S. 338 (1977), is misplaced. The seizure in that
case was supported by an earlier tax assessment that was "given the force
of a judgment." Id., at 352, n. 18 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We emphasized that the owner of the automobiles in question lacked a
privacy interest, but he had also lost any possessory interest in the property
by way of the prior judgment. In this case, despite plenty of time to obtain a
warrant that would provide similar pre-seizure authority for the police, they
acted entirely on their own assessment of the probative force of evidence
relating to earlier events. In addition, White's property interests in his car
were apparently not extinguished until, at the earliest, the seizure took
place. See Fla. Stat. §§932.703(1)(c)-(d) (1997) (the State acquires rights,
interest, and title in contraband articles at the time of seizure, and the
seizing agency may not use the seized property until such rights, interest, and
title are "perfected" in accordance with the statute); §932.704(8);
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 56, 63-64 (1992). This statutory scheme
and its aims, see Fla. Stat. §932.704(1) (1997), also distinguish more mundane
and temporary vehicle seizures performed for regulatory purposes and immediate
public needs, such as a tow from a no-parking zone. No one contends that a
warrant is necessary in that case.