AGUILAR
v.
TEXAS,
378
U.S. 108 (1964)
CERTIORARI TO
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS.
No. 548.
Argued March
25-26, 1964.
Decided June
15, 1964.
The affidavit given by police officers to obtain a
state search warrant stated that: "Affiants have received reliable
information from a credible person and do believe that heroin . . . and other
narcotics . . . are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose
of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law." The affidavit
provided no further information concerning either the undisclosed informant or
the reliability of the information. The warrant was issued, a search made, and
the evidence obtained was admitted at the trial at which petitioner was found
guilty of possessing heroin. Held:
1. The standard of reasonableness for obtaining a
search warrant is the same under the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments. Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, followed. P. 110.
2. Although an affidavit supporting a search warrant
may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal
observations of the affiant, the magistrate must be informed of some of the
underlying circumstances relied on by the person providing the information and
some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the
informant, whose identity was not disclosed, was creditable or his information
reliable. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, followed. Pp. 110-115.
172 Tex. Cr. R. 629, 631, 362 S. W. 2d 111, 112,
reversed and remanded.
Clyde W. Woody argued the cause and filed a brief
for petitioner.
Carl E. F. Dally argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Waggoner Carr, Attorney General of Texas, and
Gilbert J. Pena, Assistant Attorney General. [378 U.S. 108, 109]
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents questions concerning the
constitutional requirements for obtaining a state search warrant.
Two Houston police officers applied to a local
Justice of the Peace for a warrant to search for narcotics in petitioner's
home. In support of their application, the officers submitted an affidavit
which, in relevant part, recited that:
"Affiants have received reliable information
from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and
other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above
described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions
of the law."1
The search warrant was issued.
In executing the warrant, the local police, along
with federal officers, announced at petitioner's door that they [378 U.S. 108,
110] were police with a warrant. Upon hearing a commotion within the house, the
officers forced their way into the house and seized petitioner in the act of
attempting to dispose of a packet of narcotics.
At his trial in the state court, petitioner, through
his attorney, objected to the introduction of evidence obtained as a result of
the execution of the warrant. The objections were overruled and the evidence
admitted. Petitioner was convicted of illegal possession of heroin and
sentenced to serve 20 years in the state penitentiary.2 On appeal to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, the conviction was affirmed, 172 Tex. Cr. R. 629,
362 S. W. 2d 111, affirmance upheld on rehearing, 172 Tex. Cr. R. 631, 362 S.
W. 2d 112. We granted a writ of certiorari to consider the important
constitutional questions involved. 375 U.S. 812.
In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, we held that the
Fourth "Amendment's proscriptions are enforced against the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment," and that "the standard of reasonableness
is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id., at 33.
Although Ker involved a search without a warrant, that case must certainly be
read as holding that the standard for obtaining a search warrant is likewise
"the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."
An evaluation of the constitutionality of a search
warrant should begin with the rule that "the informed and deliberate
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants . . . are to be
preferred over the hurried action [378 U.S. 108, 111] of officers . . . who may
happen to make arrests." United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464.
The reasons for this rule go to the foundations of the Fourth Amendment. A
contrary rule "that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers
in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and
leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police
officers." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14. Under such a rule
"resort to [warrants] would ultimately be discouraged." Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270. Thus, when a search is based upon a
magistrate's, rather than a police officer's, determination of probable cause,
the reviewing courts will accept evidence of a less "judicially competent
or persuasive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his
own without a warrant," ibid., and will sustain the judicial determination
so long as "there was substantial basis for [the magistrate] to conclude
that narcotics were probably present . . . ." Id., at 271. As so well
stated by Mr. Justice Jackson:
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 13-14.
Although the reviewing court will pay substantial
deference to judicial determinations of probable cause, the court must still
insist that the magistrate perform his "neutral and detached"
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police. [378 U.S. 108,
112]
In Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, a warrant
was issued upon the sworn allegation that the affiant "has cause to
suspect and does believe" that certain merchandise was in a specified
location. Id., at 44. The Court, noting that the affidavit "went upon a
mere affirmation of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate
supporting facts," id., at 46 (emphasis added), announced the following
rule:
"Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may not
properly issue a warrant to search a private dwelling unless he can find
probable cause therefor from facts or circumstances presented to him under oath
or affirmation. Mere affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough."
Id., at 47. (Emphasis added.)
The Court, in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480, applied this rule to an affidavit similar to that relied upon here.3
Affiant in that case swore that petitioner "did receive, conceal, etc.,
narcotic drugs . . . with knowledge of unlawful importation . . . ." Id.,
at 481. The Court announced the guiding principles to be:
"that the inferences from the facts which lead
to the complaint `[must] be drawn by a neutral and detached [378 U.S. 108, 113]
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14. The purpose of the complaint, then, is to enable the appropriate
magistrate . . . to determine whether the `probable cause' required to support
a warrant exists. The Commissioner must judge for himself the persuasiveness of
the facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause. He should
not accept without question the complainant's mere conclusion . . . ." 357
U.S., at 486.
The Court, applying these principles to the
complaint in that case, stated that:
"it is clear that it does not pass muster
because it does not provide any basis for the Commissioner's determination . .
. that probable cause existed. The complaint contains no affirmative allegation
that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein;
it does not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief; and it does not
set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause
could be made." Ibid.
The vice in the present affidavit is at least as
great as in Nathanson and Giordenello. Here the "mere conclusion"
that petitioner possessed narcotics was not even that of the affiant himself;
it was that of an unidentified informant. The affidavit here not only
"contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal
knowledge of the matters contained therein," it does not even contain an
"affirmative allegation" that the affiant's unidentified source
"spoke with personal knowledge." For all that appears, the source
here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in
petitioner's [378 U.S. 108, 114] possession.4 The magistrate here certainly
could not "judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on . .
. to show probable cause." He necessarily accepted "without question"
the informant's "suspicion," "belief" or "mere
conclusion."
Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay
information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the
affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, the magistrate must be informed
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that
the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying
circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose
identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528,
was "credible" or his information "reliable."5 Otherwise,
[378 U.S. 108, 115] "the inferences from the facts which lead to the
complaint" will be drawn not "by a neutral and detached
magistrate," as the Constitution requires, but instead, by a police
officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime," Giordenello v. United States, supra, at 486; Johnson v. United
States, supra, at 14, or, as in this case, by an unidentified informant.
We conclude, therefore, that the search warrant
should not have been issued because the affidavit did not provide a sufficient
basis for a finding of probable cause and that [378 U.S. 108, 116] the evidence
obtained as a result of the search warrant was inadmissible in petitioner's
trial.
The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
But for Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, I would have
voted to affirm the judgment of the Texas court. Given Ker, I cannot escape the
conclusion that to do so would tend to "relax Fourth Amendment standards .
. . in derogation of law enforcement standards in the federal system . .
." (my concurring opinion in Ker, supra, at 45-46, emphasis added).
Contrary to what is suggested in the dissenting opinion of my Brother CLARK in
the present case (post, p. 118, note 1), the standards laid down in Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, did in my view reflect constitutional
requirements. Being unwilling to relax those standards for federal
prosecutions, I concur in the opinion of the Court.
Footnotes
[Footnote 1] The record does not reveal, nor is it
claimed, that any other information was brought to the attention of the Justice
of the Peace. It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant,
the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate's
attention. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486; 79 C. J. S. 872
(collecting cases). In Giordenello, the Government pointed out that the officer
who obtained the warrant "had kept petitioner under surveillance for about
one month prior to the arrest." The Court of course ignored this evidence,
since it had not been brought to the magistrate's attention. The fact that the
police may have kept petitioner's house under surveillance is thus completely
irrelevant in this case, for, in applying for the warrant, the police did not
mention any surveillance. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that a
surveillance was actually set up on petitioner's house. Officer Strickland
merely testified that "we wanted to set up surveillance on the
house." If the fact and results of such a surveillance had been appropriately
presented to the magistrate, this would, of course, present an entirely
different case.
[Footnote 2] Petitioner was also indicted on charges
of conspiring to violate the federal narcotics laws, Act of February 9, 1909,
c. 100, 35 Stat. 614, 2, as amended, 21 U.S.C. 174; Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 7237 (b), as amended, 26 U.S.C. 7237 (b). He was found not guilty by the
jury. His codefendants were found guilty and their convictions affirmed on
appeal. Garcia v. United States, 315 F.2d 679.
[Footnote 3] In Giordenello, although this Court
construed the requirement of "probable cause" contained in Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it did so "in light of the
constitutional" requirement of probable cause which that Rule implements.
Id., at 485. The case also involved an arrest warrant rather than a search
warrant, but the Court said: "The language of the Fourth Amendment, that
`. . . no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . .' of course
applies to arrest as well as search warrants." Id., at 485-486. See Ex
parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 154-157. The
principles announced in Giordenello derived, therefore, fore, from the Fourth
Amendment, and not from our supervisory power. Compare Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657. Accordingly, under Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, they may
properly guide our determination of "probable cause" under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
[Footnote 4] To approve this affidavit would open
the door to easy circumvention of the rule announced in Nathanson and
Giordenello. A police officer who arrived at the "suspicion,"
"belief" or "mere conclusion" that narcotics were in
someone's possession could not obtain a warrant. But he could convey this
conclusion to another police officer, who could then secure the warrant by
swearing that he had "received reliable information from a credible
person" that the narcotics were in someone's possession.
[Footnote 5] Such an affidavit was sustained by this
Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257. The affidavit in that case reads
as follows: "Affidavit in Support of a U.S. Commissioners Search Warrant
for Premises 1436 Meridian Place, N. W., Washington, D.C., apartment 36,
including window spaces of said apartment. Occupied by Cecil Jones and Earline
Richardson. "In the late afternoon of Tuesday, August 20, 1957, I,
Detective Thomas Didone, Jr. received information that Cecil Jones and Earline
Richardson were involved in the illicit narcotic traffic and that they kept a
ready supply of heroin on hand in the above mentioned apartment. The source of
information also relates that the two aforementioned persons kept these same
narcotics either on their person, under a pillow, on a dresser or on a window
ledge in said apartment. The source of information goes on to relate that on
many occasions the source of information has gone to said apartment and
purchased narcotic drugs from the above mentioned persons and that the
narcotics [378 U.S. 108, 115] were secreated [sic] in the above mentioned
places. The last time being August 20, 1957. "Both the aforementioned
persons are familiar to the undersigned and other members of the Narcotic
Squad. Both have admitted to the use of narcotic drugs and display needle marks
as evidence of same. "This same information, regarding the illicit
narcotic traffic, conducted by Cecil Jones and Earline Richardson, has been
given to the undersigned and to other officers of the narcotic squad by other
sources of information. "Because the source of information mentioned in
the opening paragraph has given information to the undersigned on previous
occasion and which was correct, and because this same information is given by
other sources does believe that there is now illicit narcotic drugs being
secreated [sic] in the above apartment by Cecil Jones and Earline Richardson.
"Det. Thomas Didone, Jr., Narcotic Squad, MPDC. "Subscribed and sworn
to before me this 21 day of August, 1957. "James F. Splain, U.S.
Commissioner, D.C." Id., at 267-268, n. 2. Compare, e. g., Hernandez v.
People, 153 Colo. 316, 385 P.2d 996, where the Supreme Court of Colorado,
accepting a confession of error by the State Attorney General, held that a
search warrant similar to the one here in issue violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court said: "Before the issuing magistrate can properly perform his
official function he must be apprised of the underlying facts and circumstances
which show that there is probable cause . . . ." Id., at ___, 385 P.2d, at
999.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR.
JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
First, it is well to point out the information upon
which the search warrant in question was based: About January 1, 1960, Officers
Strickland and Rogers from the narcotics division of the Houston Police
Department received reliable information from a credible person that petitioner
Aguilar had heroin and other narcotic drugs and narcotic paraphernalia in his
possession at his residence, 509 Pinckney Street, Houston, Texas; after
receiving this information the officers, the record indicates, kept the
premises of petitioner under surveillance for about a week.
On January 8, 1960, the two officers applied for a
search warrant and executed an affidavit before a justice [378 U.S. 108, 117]
of the peace in which they alleged under oath that petitioner's residence at
509 Pinckney Street "is a place where we each have reason to believe and
do believe that [Aguilar] . . . has in his possession therein narcotic drugs .
. . for the purpose of the unlawful sale thereof, and where such narcotic drugs
are unlawfully sold." In addition and in support of their belief, the
officers included in the affidavit the further allegation that they "have
received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin
. . . and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at . . .
[petitioner's] premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the
provisions of the law."
Upon executing the warrant issued on the strength of
this affidavit, the officers knocked on the door of Aguilar's house. Someone
inside asked who was there and the officers replied that they were police and
that they had a search warrant. At this they heard someone "scuffle and
start to run inside of the house." The officers entered and pursued the
petitioner, who ran into a back bathroom. Petitioner threw a packet of heroin
into the commode, but an officer retrieved the packet before it could be
flushed down the drain.
I.
At trial petitioner objected to the introduction
into evidence of the heroin obtained through execution of the search warrant on
the ground that the affidavit was "nothing more than hearsay." The
Court holds the affidavit insufficient and sets aside the conviction on the
basis of two cases, neither of which is controlling.
First is Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41
(1933). In that case the affidavit stated that the affiant had "cause to
suspect and [did] believe that certain merchandise" was in the premises
described. There was nothing in Nathanson, either in the affidavit or in the
other proof introduced at trial, to suggest that any facts [378 U.S. 108, 118]
had been brought out to support a reasonable belief or even a suspicion.
Accordingly, the Court held that "[m]ere affirmance of belief or suspicion
is not enough." At 47. But in Fourth Amendment cases findings of
reasonableness or of probable cause necessarily rest on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. In Aguilar, the affidavit was based not
only on "affirmance of belief" but in addition upon "reliable
information from a credible person" plus a week's surveillance by the
affiants. (Emphasis supplied.) Nathanson is, therefore, not apposite.
The second case the Court relies on is Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). There the affidavit alleged that
"Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs, to-wit: heroin
hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful importation . . . ." The opinion
of the Court, by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after discussing Rules 3 and 4 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, held that the defect in the complaint was
that it "does not provide any basis for the Commissioner's determination
under Rule 4 that probable cause existed." At 486. The dissent in the
case, in commenting on the Court's holding that the complaint was invalid,
said: "The Court does not strike down this complaint directly on the
Fourth Amendment, but merely on an extension of Rule 4." At 491. Since
Giordenello was a federal case, decided under our supervisory powers (Rules 3
and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), it does not control here.1
As we said in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963), "the demands of
our federal system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible
because of our supervisory powers over federal courts and [378 U.S. 108, 119]
that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United States
Constitution."
Even if Giordenello was rested on the Constitution,
it would not be controlling here because of the significant differences in the
facts of the two cases. In Giordenello the Court said: "The complaint . .
. does not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief; and it does not
set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a finding of probable cause
could be made." 357 U.S., at 486. (Emphasis supplied.) Here, in Aguilar's
case, the affidavit did allege a source for the complainant's belief. i. e.,
"reliable information from a credible person . . . that heroin . . . and
other narcotics . . . are being kept" in petitioner's premises "for
the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law." This
takes the affidavit here entirely outside the Giordenello holding. In
Giordenello no source of information was stated, whereas here there was a
reliable one. The affidavit thus shows "probable cause" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as that Amendment was interpreted by this
Court in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), where it was contended
that the information given by an informant to an officer was inadmissible because
it was hearsay. The Court in Draper held that petitioner was "entirely in
error. Brinegar v. United States . . . has settled the question the other
way." At 311. In the following year this was reaffirmed in Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960): "We conclude therefore that hearsay may
be the basis for a warrant."2 [378 U.S. 108, 120] Furthermore, in the case
of Rugendorf v. United States, decided only this Term, we held an affidavit
good based on information that an informer had seen certain furs in Rugendorf's
basement. 376 U.S. 528. In the Aguilar affidavit the informer told the officers
that narcotics were actually "kept at the above described premises for the
purpose of sale . . . ." The Court seems to hold that what the informer says
is the test of his reliability. I submit that this has nothing to do with it.
The officer's experience with the informer is the test and here the two
officers swore that the informer was credible and the information reliable. At
the hearing on the motion to suppress Officer Strickland testified that he
delayed getting the search warrant for a week in order to "set up
surveillance on the house." The informant's statement, Officer Strickland
said, was "the first information" received and was only "some
of" that which supported the application for the warrant. The totality of
the circumstances upon which the officer relied is certainly pertinent to the
validity of the warrant. See the use of such testimony in Giordenello, supra,
at 485, 486. And, just as in that case, there is nothing in the record here to
show what the officers verbally told the magistrate. The surveillance of
Aguilar's house, which is confirmed by the State's brief, apparently gave the
officers further evidence upon which they based their personal belief. Hence
the affidavit here is a far cry from "suspicion" or "affirmance
of belief." It was based on reliable information from a credible informant
plus personal surveillance by the officers.
Furthermore, the Courts of Appeals have often
approved affidavits similar to the one here. See, e. g., United States v.
Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534 (C.
A. 6th Cir.); United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 715 (C. A. 2d Cir.)
(dictum); and United States v. Meeks, 313 F.2d 464 [378 U.S. 108, 121] (C. A.
6th Cir.). We denied certiorari in Eisner, 369 U.S. 859, although the affidavit
there stated only that "[i]nformation has been obtained by S. A. Clifford
Anderson . . . which he believes to be reliable . . .," 297 F.2d, at 596,
and in Evans, 353 U.S. 976, where the affiant was a man who "came to the
headquarters of the federal liquor law enforcement officers and stated that he
wished to give information . . .," 242 F.2d, at 535.
In summary, the information must be more than mere
wholly unsupported suspicion but less than "would justify
condemnation," as Chief Justice Marshall said in Locke v. United States, 7
Cranch 339, 348 (1813). As Chief Justice Taft said in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925): Probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] . . . sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been
or is being committed. And as Mr. Justice Rutledge so well stated in Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949):
"These long-prevailing standards seek to
safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection. Because many situations which
confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to
their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical,
nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for
accommodating these often opposing interests. [378 U.S. 108, 122] Requiring
more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Believing that the Court has substituted a rigid,
academic formula for the unrigid standards of reasonableness and "probable
cause" laid down by the Fourth Amendment itself - a substitution of
technicality for practicality - and believing that the Court's holding will tend
to obstruct the administration of criminal justice throughout the country, I
respectfully dissent.
[Footnote 1] MR. JUSTICE BLACK, who joined the
Court's opinion in Giordenello, joins this dissent on the basis of his belief
that Giordenello was based on Rule 4 and not on the less exacting requirements
of the Fourth Amendment.
[Footnote 2] The affidavit in Jones was more
detailed, including a statement of where the heroin might be found, viz.,
"on their person, under a pillow, on a dresser or on a window ledge in said
apartment." But this detail adds nothing to the reliability of the
information furnished. Likewise, the allegation in Jones that the informer had
"on previous occasion" given information "which was
correct" was contained in substance in the Aguilar affidavit. [378 U.S.
108, 123]